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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Mellisa

jury

Ann

Estrada appeals from her convictions for forgery and grand theft following a

trial.

Statement

Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

The following

facts are taken

from testimony presented

at trial.

In June 2018, Detective

Jacob Pleger 0f the Coeur d’Alene Police Department received a report of a forgery from

employees 0f Safe Passage, a non-proﬁt organization which provides grants 0f money for housing

and

rental assistance t0 survivors

— p.200,

p.199, L.24

L.4.)

The

0f domestic Violence and sexual

assault.

(T11,

p.174, Ls.8-24;

detective spoke to the executive director, Chauntelle Lieske, and

the ofﬁce manager, Patricia Wheeler. (Tr., p.174, L.25

— p.175,

L.15.)

On July 9,

2018, Detective

Pleger talked to Estrada at her residence, and she said that she had used Safe Passage funds t0 pay
for her

own

rent without permission.

(Tr.,

p.178, L.23

— p.179,

L.3; p.183, Ls.4-12; p.195, Ls.9-

14.)

In

March 2018, Estrada had been

the

Housing Advocate

for Safe Passage for just over

year and Ms. Wheeler was her direct supervisor during that time.

procedures

at

(Tr.,

p.203, Ls.6-8, 13-15.)

one

The

Safe Passage were explained by Ms. Wheeler. After meeting with a client requesting

housing assistance, Estrada would discuss the request With Ms. Wheeler, often with a form Estrada
ﬁlled out for housing assistance funds.

(Tr.,

p.202, L.12

—

p.

203, L.24; p.294, Ls.7—20.) Other

information was supposed to accompany the housing assistance request form, “[u]sua11y a lease or

an eviction notice or a pay vacate order 0r something
[Ms. Wheeler] With

some point

at

—

that those are

a later time.”

(Tr.,

on the way, so the

p.204, Ls. 11-16.)

like that.

client

Sometimes they would come

t0

be bringing them in

at

was going

to

housing assistance request was approved, Ms. Wheeler would sign

If a

ﬁnance

director,

not sign

L.10.)

and take

it

t0 the

Mac Rebmann, t0 “cut a check” — always t0 the vendor, not the client — but he did

(TL, p.203, L.24

it.

it

— p.204,

L.3; p.206, Ls.17—19; p.207, Ls.9-18; p.294, L.24

The checks were then signed by Ms. Lieske, but

if the

checks had t0 have a second signature from a “board person.”

—

p.295,

amount was more than $300,

(T11,

p.206, L.17

— p.207,

the

L.2; p.296,

Ls.3-13.)

Neither Ms. Wheeler nor Ms. Lieske ever gave Estrada permission to pay her rent from
Safe Passage ﬁmds, nor were they authorized to d0 so.

(Tn, p.250, Ls.11-16; p.306, Ls.9-18.)

Estrada was terminated from her employment With Safe Passage in June 20 1 8 for reasons unrelated
to this case,

and Ms. Wheeler was given the task 0f going through her desk. (Tn, p.215, L.23 —

p.216, L.8; p.296, L.25

— p.297,

L.7.)

In the desk drawers,

Ms. Wheeler found

client ﬁles

loose documents outside of ﬁles that could not be matched With anything. (TL, p.216, L.9

L.8.)

and

— p.217,

Among them were:
State Exhibit 1: a Residential Lease Agreement in the name of “Active Property
Management.” (Tn, p.158, L.24 —p.159, L.8; p.217, L.12 — p.218, L.3; p.298, Ls.317.)

a property management lease with “Vista Property Management”
on the top. (TL, p.218, L.16 — p.219, L.8.) It is evident that the “Vista
Property Management” heading was inserted by “a cut out piece 0f paper taped
State Exhibit 2:

written

onto the document.” (Tn, p.159, L.22
22; p.298, L.18 — p.299, L.1.)

—

p.160, L.7; p.227, Ls.16-23; p.297, Ls.8-

photocopy 0f State Exhibit 2. (Tn, p.160, Ls.15-22; p.219, L.18
L.11.) State Exhibit 3 is also a photocopy 0f most 0f State Exhibit 1, but
EX. 3) appears t0 have had its heading altered. (Tn, p.227, L.24 — p.228, L.6.)

State Exhibit 3: a

— p.220,
it

(St.

State Exhibit 4:
altered

top

—

by

a Three-Day Notice t0

Pay 0r

Quit,

Which had the

renter’s

name

name

at the

either taping over or using correction tape t0 put a different

[N.M.].[1]

(Tn, p.228, L.7

— p.229,

L.8; p.300, L.3

— p.301,

L.3.)

The Three-

1

Because the name of Safe Passage’s client was ordered to remain conﬁdential during the
the same requirement Will be followed here. (Tn, p.230, Ls.16-22.)
2

trial,

Day Notice was

the type of documentation that served to support a request for

housing assistance. (TL, p.228, Ls.9-18.)

When Ms. Wheeler found the
pair the

p.23

1,

above documents in Estrada’s desk, she

documents up With any existing

L.4.)

The two women took

ﬁle, so she took

the documents t0

Passage, and he ran a QuickBooks report to

$200 and one

0n

that report,

for $450. (Tn, p.23

1,

to

the

ﬁnance director for Safe

ﬁnd all the checks written for housing rental assistance,

L.5 —p.232,

L3;

0n March

for client services

p.240, Ls.5-21;

St.

— p.244,

8,

2018. (Tn, p.243,

L.9.)

Exs. 5 and

(St.

2018, one

Ms. Wheeler made an Excel Spreadsheet which similarly showed the same two

The two checks were issued

Forms

8,

EX. 12.) Based in part

checks had been issued t0 Vista Property Management (“Vista”) 0n March
L.8

but could not,

Ms. Lieske. (Tn, p.230, L.25 —

Mac Rebmann,

Which showed two checks were issued by Safe Passage
for

them

tried,

9), for

in response to

two Housing Financial Assistance Request

$200 and $450 (respectively) dated March

7,

2018, and signed by

Estrada and Ms. Wheeler; the payee 0n each check was Vista and the client identiﬁcation numbers

corresponded to existing Safe Passage clients?
p.270, L.17; p.302, L.11

— p.305, L.14;

St.

EX.

8.)

(Tn, p.244, L.21

—

The two ﬁnancial

p.245, L.12; p.267, L.21

assistance request forms (St.

EXS. 5 and 9) were in Estrada’s handwriting3 and were presented t0 Ms. Wheeler
p.208, L.16

— p.215,

2

(TL, p.245, Ls.13-19.) Reports generated through the

The names of Safe Passage

identiﬁcation numbers were
conﬁdentiality.
3

by Estrada.

(TL,

L.18.)

Safe Passage maintained a physical ﬁle and a ﬁle in the

client.

—

clients are not

“ALICE” system

ALICE

system

(St.

0n housing assistance request forms;

t0 track

each

EXS. 6 and 10)

instead,

unique

assigned to clients through a system to protect the clients’

(Tn, p.204, L.23

— p.205,

L.12.)

A sticky note stating that more documentation was forthcoming was attached t0 State Exhibit 9,

Which was

also in Estrada’s handwriting. (Tn, p.21
3

1,

Ls.13—18; p.212, L.24

— p.213,

L.3.)

were prepared
5

and

9),

for each

clients associated

with the two housing assistance requests

and those reports showed that, although the

assistance, nor

L.

of the

had they utilized Vista

clients existed, neither

EXS.

(St.

had requested housing

(E generally Tn, p.245, L.20 — p.250,

for rental purposes.

1 .)

On March 7, 2018, Estrada was behind 0n her rent,

and Jill White, ofﬁce manager for Vista

(through which Estrada rented her home), posted a Three-Day Notice t0 Pay 0r Quit on the door

0f Estrada’s residence.4 (Tn, p.348, L.1 — p.349, L.17; p.351, L.17 — p.352, L.13; p.368, Ls.1217; St. Exs. 14, 15.)

Estrada sent an e-mail t0 Ms. White 0n

We

March

12,

2018, stating in

part:

0n a board member t0 sign checks, our
payroll person was let go and they didn’t prepare enough in advance t0 have check
as well as reimbursement for travel taken care 0f. I asked that my reimbursement
checks be made directly t0 Vista property to skip the wait for it to clear. This
month’s rent will be paid in full by friday.
I

got the 3 day notice.

EX. 17;

(St.

ﬂ

are waiting

Tn, p.357, Ls.5-22; p.360, Ls.8—19.)

On March

19, 2018, Estrada again sent

an

e-

mail to Ms. White, this time informing her that “[t]w0 checks should have been either mailed 0r
taken there by friday.”
14,

(St.

EX. 18;

ﬂ

Tr.,

p.358, L.12

L.1, p. 360, Ls.20-23.)

2018, Estrada e-mailed a message t0 Ms. White asking, “[c]an u please

amount you received from Sage Passage because
359, Ls.10—24; p.360, L.24

4

— p.359,

The Three-Day Notice

— p.361,

(St.

it

let

should have been 650.00.”

me know
(St.

On May
the total

EX. 19;

ﬂ

Tn,

L.3.)

EX. 15) appears to have been used to create the Three-Day Notice

was ﬁred — with the exception that the renter’s name
—
L.7
p.229, L.19; p.300, L.3 — p.301, L.3.) The name 0f

(St. EX. 4) found in Estrada’s desk after she

had been changed t0 N.M. (Tn, p.228,
N.M. 0n the Three-Day Notice found in Estrada’s desk
identiﬁcation

number of

(St.

EX. 4) corresponded with the client

either State Exhibit 5 or State Exhibit 9

—

the

two housing assistance

request forms leading t0 the issuance 0f checks for $200 and $450 t0 Vista Property Management.
(T12,

p.244, L.21

L.14;
4)

St.

EX.

8.)

—

p.245, L.12; p.264, Ls.4-12; p.267, L.21

—

p.270, L.17; p.302, L.11

In sum, Estrada appears t0 have prepared a falsiﬁed

from her own Three-Day Notice

(St.

Three-Day Notice

EX. 15) to support one of those requests.

4

— p.305,
(St.

EX.

According to Ms. White and Teresa Dawson, the
accounting for Vista in March 2018, Estrada’s

Notice was delivered t0 her 0n March

and $450)
ledger.

that

p.348, L.1

(T11,

p.369, L.7

were deposited

— p.370,

into

— p.349,

its

7,

6‘

tenant ledger”

of

whom

showed

did bookkeeping and

that after the

Three-Day

2018, Vista received two checks from Safe Passage ($200

account 0n March 19, 2018, and credited t0 Estrada’s tenant

L.17; p.361, L.15

L.6; Tn, p.372, L.1

for Vista to receive checks directly

latter

— p.373,

— p.363, L6;

L.2.).)

p.366, Ls.14-22; p.368, L.18-21;

Ms. Dawson explained

from Safe Passage

for rent

payment —

it

that

it

was unusual

had not happened

before. (T11, p.370, Ls.7-11.)

The

state

charged Estrada with forgery and grand theft of a ﬁnancial instrument (R.,

pp.134-135), and a jury convicted her of both offenses (R., p.152; Tn, p.417, Ls.12-17.)
district court

ﬁxed,

all

The

sentenced Estrada t0 identical concurrent sentences 0f ﬁve years, with two years

suspended, and placed her 0n supervised probation for two years.

(R.,

pp.203-206.)

Estrada ﬁled a Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, which was denied. (R., pp.238-240,

253-254.) Estrada ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal. (R., pp.21 1-216, 229-235.)

ISSUES
Estrada states the issues on appeal

1.

Did

as:

the district court err and abuse

its

discretion

by allowing

the State t0

introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and confusing evidence that Ms.

Estrada was ﬁred from Safe Passage?

2.

Did

the district court err

that Safe

by allowing

Passage modiﬁed

its

the State to introduce irrelevant evidence

housing ﬁnding request policies in response to

this alleged incident?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The
1.

failed to

as:

court abused

its

discretion in permitting testimony

show that the district court abused its discretion by allowing testimony
Safe Passage modiﬁed its procedures in response t0 her offenses?

Has Estrada

that

on appeal

show that the district
she had been ﬁred by Safe Passage?

Has Estrada

that
2.

state rephrases the issues

failed t0

ARGUMENT
I.

Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Permitting
Testimony That She Had Been Fired BV Safe Passage

Estrada Has Failed To

A.

Introduction

Prior t0

trial,

Estrada ﬁled a motion in limine requesting, in part, the exclusion 0f “[a]11

evidence regarding [her] work performance While employed by Safe Passage based 0n I.R.E.401404[.]”

(R., pp.98-99.)

At a hearing on

that motion, the district court ruled that the state could

present testimony that Safe Passage severed

it)

in order to explain to the jury

why,

its

relationship with Estrada (but not the reasons for

after the termination, a supervisor searched Estrada’s

and found documents and papers which implicated Estrada

in criminality.

(Tn, p.59,

desk

L22 — p.61,

L.5.)

On

appeal, Estrada contends that “[e]Vidence that [she]

irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial,

discretion

by admitting

it.”

and confusing, and thus the

was ﬁred from Safe Passage was

district court erred

and abused

its

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) However, a review of the record reveals that

the district court properly permitted the state to present testimony that Estrada

was terminated from

her job with Safe Passage.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“This Court reviews challenges t0 a
discretion standard.” Perry V.

(2000).

trial

court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse of

Magic Valley Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

“Trial courts maintain broad discretion in admitting

134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816, 820

and excluding evidence.” State

V.

Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 487, 447 P.3d 930, 935 (2019).

An exception to this broad discretion is relevance, Which is “a matter of law that is
to free review.”

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 774,

419 P.3d 1042, 1072 (2018).

subj ect

Evidence

is

relevant if it has “any tendency” t0

“Whether a

0r less probable.” I.R.E. 401.

its

9)
a fact “of consequence in determining the action,

make

fact is ‘of

relationship to the legal theories presented

P.3d

by the

consequence’ or material

parties.” State V. Garcia,

is

_

‘6

more

determined by
Idaho

_,

_

_, No. 46253, 2020 WL 2029266, at *4 (Idaho Apr. 28, 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

“Even relevant evidence may be excluded by the district court if ‘its probative value is
outweighed by a danger 0f

.

.

.

unfair prejudice[.]

’”

Li. (brackets original,

quoting I.R.E. 403).

lower court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless

be an abuse 0f discretion.” State

V.

Hernandez, 163 Idaho

substantially

it is

407 P.3d 596, 603

9, 16,

“A

shown t0
(Ct.

App.

2017).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse
Fired

At

Its

Discretion

on Estrada’s motion

the hearing

[Estrada’s ﬁring]

is

relevant

Wheeler went through and

is

because

contended that “[t]he reason

in limine, the state

when —

after [she]

started going through the

paperwork and found the doctored paperwork
Ls. 11-16.)

BV Admitting Testimony That Estrada Was

By Safe Passage

was

terminated[,] that

desk t0

that started this

start

Whole

was when Ms.

organizing

some of

investigation.”

the

(TL, p.57,

Estrada requested an order excluding such testimony, arguing that her ﬁring was not

relevant, nor

would

it

have been admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (Tn, p.58, L.21 — p.59, L.20.)

Responding immediately

to Estrada’s

Rule 404(b) argument, but Without speciﬁcally mentioning

the rule, the district court stated:

A11 right.

Thank you.

I’m going

to rule

0n the issue at

this point. It’s discretionary

as t0 the introduction of evidence or exclusion of evidence.
discretion.

I’m going

their relationship.

And

I

With the Court
recognize that

to allow the State to present evidence that they

had severed

The business

their

which Ms. Estrada had been working had severed
relationship with Ms. Estrada which led t0 the discovery 0f the evidence that
entity for

the State believes will support the charges, but Without reference t0 the purpose for

the severance of that relationship 0r the reason underlying

And I think it has to be made
to the jury or the State

relationship
for

(Trial

I

Will

can present evidence of

was unconnected With

do

this

by limiting

this, that the

the evidence that

some other independent and unrelated

And

and

clear,

it.

instruction

severance of the

was eventually found;

it

was

reason.

so that will be order 0f the Court

on

that particular issue.

TL, p.59, L.21 — p.60, L.16 (emphasis added).)
Later, after further discussion about

I’m not going

its

to prescribe the

unpleasant phrase, but that’s

ruling, the court explained:

words

that they use, but terminate is such

Why I used severed from their relationship. The

an

State

can put on the evidence they believe appropriate, but just not the reason for that
termination, and the fact that it was unrelated t0 the charges alleged here.
(Trial Tr., p.60,

The

L.24 — p.61, L.5.)

state

was concerned

that

Ms. Wheeler’s actions would be seen by the jury

invasion 0f Estrada’s personal items from her desk. The district court acknowledged

and decided

that the state

was

Estrada’s desk after Estrada

analysis, the Idaho

entitled to explain t0 the jury

was ﬁred, but not

why Ms. Wheeler was

that,

In a similar

under I.R.E. 404(b), testimony that the

defendant was 0n probation was relevant to explain t0 the jury

underwear,

discretion

going through

to reveal the reasons for her ﬁring.

Supreme Court recently held

its

why

ofﬁcers searched his

stating:

In the present case, the district court admitted the probation evidence, not for a

propensity purpose, but to provide context for the search.

We

agree that the

probation evidence was relevant for the non-propensity purpose 0f explaining the
police ofﬁcers’ actions.
(2008)],

Like in [State

v.

Where evidence of an outstanding

why police ofﬁcers
on probation
underwear.

is

Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476
arrest

warrant was relevant to explaining

searched the defendant’s vehicle, here, evidence that Jones was

relevant to explaining

Why

as an

the police ofﬁcers searched his

for publication in

district court

_,

Idaho

State V. Jones,

permanent law

P.3d

_, 2020 WL 21

1

1375, *5

(May

4,

2020) (not released

Noting that one 0f the ways the

reports; subject to revision).

attempted to limit any prejudice was by directing the state to not reveal the crime

Jones had been convicted

its

_

of, the

Idaho Supreme Court concluded, “the

district court

did not abuse

was not

discretion in determining that the probative value of the probation evidence

substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

The disputed testimony in both

m

and

I_d.

at *7.

in Estrada’s trial

was

why

relevant in explaining

searches were properly conducted, leading t0 the seizure of incriminating evidence. Similar t0 the

m

attempt in

0f, the district

to limit prejudice

by precluding testimony about What crime Jones was convicted

court in Estrada’s case tried to limit prejudice

by excluding testimony regarding

speciﬁc grounds for her ﬁring. Further, the evidence of Estrada’s ﬁring
prejudicial than the evidence that revealed Jones

convicted 0f a crime.
explaining

Why

As

in

m,

this

is

the

certainly less potentially

was 0n probation obviously because he had been

Court should afﬁrm the

district court’ s ruling that

the search of Estrada’s desk at Safe Passage

was

testimony

relevant and not unfairly

prejudicial.

Finally, although Estrada maintains

on appeal,

as she did below, that the state “could

simply presented evidence that [she] no longer worked
that

would not explain Why

had

quit her job

on her own terms,

may have been

Safe Passage” (Appellant’s brief, p.6),

the incriminating documents were

incriminating documents in her desk.

departure

at

it

still

in Estrada’s desk.

would have been unlikely

that she

If Estrada

would have

However, being ﬁred from her job indicates

abrupt enough t0 explain

Why

have

those documents were

still

left

that her

there.

By

stating that Estrada’s ﬁring “led to the discovery ofthe evidence that the state believes will support

the charges” (T12, p.60, Ls.3-8),

it is

reasonable to infer that the court concluded her ﬁring was

10

relevant not only to explain

t0 explain

Why

why Ms. Wheeler was

the incriminating documents

were

go through Estrada’s desk, but also

entitled to

still

in her desk.

This Court should conclude,

under free review, that evidence 0f Estrada’s ﬁring was relevant in both those ways.
Idaho

at

show any

774, 419 P.3d at 1072; I.R.E. 401. Estrada has failed t0

E

error, or

Hill, 163

an abuse 0f

discretion, in the district court’s ruling.

D.

Any Error Was Harmless
Even

if there

was

error, the error

was harmless. Under

ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief

substantial right of

(quotation omitted).

“T0

one of the

E

parties.”

I.C.R. 52 “if there

on appeal only

State V. Joy, 155 Idaho

establish harmless error, the State

if the error affects

372 P.3d 382, 390 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). Even

V.

a

224 P.3d 485, 487 (2009).

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

complained 0f did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State

an incorrect

304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013)

1, 6,

also State V. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 420,

is

that the error

Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 335,

if the district court erred in

permitting

testimony informing the jury that Estrada had been ﬁred by Safe Passage, such testimony would
not have affected her substantial rights.

The testimony and evidence presented

at trial, as set forth in the

0f this brief and relied upon here, shows that any error by the

Statement of Facts section

district court evidentiary ruling

did

not contribute t0 the verdict 0r affect Estrada’s substantial rights. With regard t0 forgery, the state

was required

t0

prove that Estrada, “with the intent

counterfeited a contract; and/or

[]

forged, or counterfeited contract

t0

defraud another; falsely altered, forged 0r

did pass or attempt t0 pass as true and genuine a false, altered,

knowing

the

same

t0

be

false, altered, forged, or counterfeited,

with the intent to prejudice, damage, 0r defraud any person.

.”
.

.

Although Estrada apparently never presented the forged lease

11

(R.,

p.166 (emphasis added).)

t0 Safe

Passage employees, the

—

forged lease

altered to read “Vista Property

Property Management”

(St.

EX.

1)

Management”

(St.

— was prepared by Estrada

Exs. 2 and 3) instead of “Active

in the event she

her phony ﬁnancial assistance requests t0 Safe Passage to pay her past-due rent.

needed

to support

As the prosecutor

told the jury:

And

then

we have

Exhibit No. 9, Which

is

the housing request for the $450.

And

note the sticky note that’s on there that Patty testiﬁed was in Mellisa’s handwriting.

That sticky note speciﬁcally says that the client understands that there is further
documentation that needs t0 be brought. Ibelieve the exact verbiage, “Client knows
to bring

in case

copy of lease once signed.”

So Mellisa knew she needed t0 have supporting documentation at the ready
someone started asking more questions. That is why she forged those lease

agreements.
(TL, p.409, Ls. 1 1-22; see

Tr.,

p.413, L.21

— p.414,

The evidentiary ruling by the

L.6.)

district court

regarding Estrada’s ﬁring from Safe Passage did not contribute t0 her forgery conviction.

Similarly,

conviction.

any error by the

The jury was

district court’s ruling

did not contribute t0 Estrada’s grand theft

instructed that, to convict Estrada 0f that offense,

it

had

to

ﬁnd beyond

a reasonable doubt that she “wrongﬁﬂly took, obtained 0r withheld property described as a check

and/or checks With the numbers 16051 and/or 16052 from an owner, With the intent to deprive an

owner of the property or
for the

t0 appropriate the property,

payment 0f money upon any bank.”

that Estrada obtained

two checks,

for

and the property was a check,

(R., p.169.)

The testimony presented

Passage t0 d0

so.

Given such

at trial

t0 Vista to

pay her own

rent

order

shows

$200 and $450, from Safe Passage through wrongful

such as preparing housing assistance requests in the name 0f clients

and having the funds directed

draft, or

acts,

who never made such requests,

— Without any

authorization from Safe

clear evidence of Estrada’s guilt for grand theft, the district court’s

admission of her “termination” from Safe Passage could not have contributed to her conviction.
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Estrada contends that the “only possible purpose for introducing evidence that [she] was

ﬁred was

t0

show

that she is a

bad person.” (Appellant’s

notion that being ﬁred from a job shows that a person

was deemed a “bad person,”

knew

is

brief, p.7.)

There

that Estrada’s termination occurred in

n0 support

left in society.

Assuming
for

it

knew

that Estrada’s termination

the jury believed Estrada

t0 conclude,

based 0n that

The jury

June 2018, and that Safe Passage discovered the

incriminating documents that were in her desk after that occurred. (TL, p.296, L.25
Therefore, the jury

for the

“bad.” If everyone ever ﬁred from a job

would be very few “good persons”

there

is

had nothing

was not a good employee,

belief, that she

was

it

to

— p.297,

L. 14.)

d0 with her current offenses.5

would not have been reasonable

also guilty of forgery

and grand

theft.

II.

Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Allowing
Testimony That Safe Passage Modiﬁed Its Procedures In Response To Her Offenses

Estrada Has Failed T0

A.

Introduction

During

trial,

Estrada’s counsel objected

whether Safe Passage changed

its

When

the prosecutor asked Chauntelle Lieske

procedure for housing assistance requests after Estrada’s crimes

were discovered. The colloquy went as follows:

[PROSECUTOR]: Q. So, Ms. Lieske, you indicated that it’s a different process
now than it was back in March of 2018. When this was discovered back in June 0f
2018, did Safe Passage seek to revamp their housing assistance request program?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Judge, objection under rule 0f evidence regarding

remedial measures. I think

THE COURT:
5

Although the

it’s

not admissible.

Overruled 0n those grounds.

district court said

it

would

issue a “limiting instruction to the jury 0r the State can

present evidence of this, that the severance 0f the relationship
that

was eventually found”

told the jury during opening statement, “[Ms.

forms, and she Will
Estrada’s

was unconnected With

Wheeler

will] tell

you about these speciﬁc request
mid-June 2018, Ms.

that she discovered these issues because in

you
employment With Safe Passage was terminated 0n other grounds.”
tell

the evidence

(Tn, p.60, Ls.3-14), neither action took place. Instead, the prosecutor

13

(T11,

p.152, Ls.4-8.)

THE WITNESS:

Yes,

[PROSECUTOR]:

Q.

we

did.

And What type 0f changes were made?

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m going to object again on the same basis. I
know under the rules of evidence that type of evidence is not permitted. Thank
you.

THE COURT:

Which rule ofevidence are you referring

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
Honor,

I

I’ll

apologize. I think

THE COURT:

look that up.

it’s

Iknow

it’s

t0,

please?

in the four hundreds,

your

407, your Honor.

What’s the response from the State?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor,

don’t believe that 407 applies in this matter. This

I

indicates that, “Evidence 0f subsequent measures

is

not admissible t0 prove

its design, 0r a need for a
warning or instruction.” I don’t believe that any 0f those apply here, and so I don’t
believe 407 is applicable. Thank you.

negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product or

THE COURT:
the basis that

(TL, p.329, L.18

On

I’m going

it’s

t0 sustain the objection.

And I’m

not relevant what happened after the

— p.330, L.25 (emphasis

its

it

0n

added).)

appeal, Estrada contends “[t]he district court erred

Passage had modiﬁed

going to sustain

fact.

housing funding request policies

by admitting evidence

that Safe

after the alleged incident in this case[,]”

and, “in sustaining Ms. Estrada’s objection to the follow-up question 0f what those remedial

measures were, the

district court

after the alleged incident.

rule 0f relevance,

applies equally t0

and

recognized that evidence was not relevant because

What the

court apparently failed t0 recognize

that

Rule 407

that the district court’s explanation for sustaining the

Ms. Estrada’s ﬁrst objection.” (Appellant’s

Estrada’s argument fails because

show any abuse 0f

is

it

it

happened
is itself

a

second objection

brief, pp.8-9.)

has not been preserved for appeal and she has failed to

discretion in the district court’s overruling 0f defense counsel’s objection.

Additionally, any error in the district court’s ruling

14

is

harmless.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The general

rule in Idaho is that an appellate court Will not consider an alleged error

appeal in the absence 0f a timely objection
77, 82 (Ct.

App. 201

1);

“[f]or an obj ection to

at trial.

254 P.3d

State V. Norton, 15 1 Idaho 176, 181,

Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634, 977 P.2d 890, 896 (1999).

State V.

on

Further,

be preserved for appellate review, the speciﬁc ground for the obj ection must

be clearly stated.” State

V.

Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing

130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727

I.R.E. 103(a)(1); State V. Gleason,

(Ct.

App. 1997)).

“Objecting to the admission of evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different
basis for exclusion 0f the evidence.”

I_d.

(citing State V. Higgins,

122 Idaho 590, 596, 836 P.2d

536, 542 (1992); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592, 944 P.2d at 727).

On

appeal, the Court “reviews questions of admissibility 0f evidence using a

mixed

standard 0f review.” State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). Whether

evidence

is

relevant

is

a question of law reviewed de novo, but whether the evidence

exclusion under I.R.E. 403

lower court abused

“whether the

its

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.

Li.

subj ect to

In evaluating Whether a

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry,

trial court: (1)

is

Which asks

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within the

m

outer boundaries 0f its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable to the

speciﬁc choices available t0

it;

Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018)

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
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by

(citing

the exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

MV Fun

Life, 163

C.

To The District Court’s Evidentiarv Ruling Has Not Been Preserved
For Appeal; Regardless, The Court Correctly Overruled Her Obiection
Estrada’s Challenge

Estrada’s argument misses the essence of the district court’s ruling.

objection to the question of Whether any remedial measures were taken

lacked speciﬁcity. Therefore, the
reasons,

its

district court’s ruling is

Her

counsel’s

trial

was overruled because

it

not subject t0 review and, for the same

ruling did not constitute an abuse 0f discretion.6

Supreme Court recently explained:

Citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1)(B),7 the Idaho

[W]hile a party

may challenge

the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence (Le. the

quantum 0f

evidence) for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, this Court has long required obj ections t0 the

To preserve an evidentiary
must be
clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.”
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 602, 301 P.3d 242, 260 (2013) (quoting State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)); I.R.E. 103(a)(1)(B).
admissibility of evidence to be raised below. Id.

obj ection for appellate review, “either the speciﬁc ground for the obj ection

State V. Hess,

_

Idaho

_, 462 P.3d 1171,

_

Defense counsel’s objection was vague,
regarding remedial measures.

I

think

it’s

(2020).

stating, “Judge, objection

under rule of evidence

not admissible.” (Tn, p.329, Ls.23-25.) Recognizing

6

Whether the issue is preserved for appeal, and Whether the district court erred in its ruling, are
both dependent upon whether Estrada’s objection stated a “speciﬁc ground” or “it was apparent
from the context[.]”
7

Rule 103,
(a)

I.R.E. 103(a)(1)(B). Therefore, the following

argument applies to both issues.

I.R.E., states in relevant part:

Preserving a Claim 0f Error.

exclude evidence only
(1) if the ruling

A party may claim error in a ruling t0

if the error affects a substantial right

admit or

0f the party and:

admits evidence, a party, 0n the record:

(A) timely obj ects or moves to

strike;

(B) states the speciﬁc ground, unless

(Emphasis added.)
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and
it

was apparentfrom

the context;

.

.

.

the lack of speciﬁcity of counsel’s objection, the court responded, “[o]verruled

(T11,

p.330, L.1 (emphasis added).)

As an indication that the

0n those grounds.”

district court’s evidentiary ruling

was

based 0n the vagueness 0f the obj ection,8 When next confronted With an objection to the question

0f what particular measures had been taken, the court asked, “[w]hich rule of evidence are you
referring to, please?” (T11, p.330, Ls.8-9.) Counsel responded, “I’ll 100k that up.

Honor

four hundreds, your

.

.

.

Ithink

.

407, your Honor.”

it’s

9

Iknow

it’s

in the

(Tn, p.330, Ls.10-12.) After the

prosecutor read Rule 407 t0 the court, the court sustained the obj ection on different grounds, ruling,
“it’s

not relevant What happened after the fact.” (Tn, p.330, Ls.24-25.)
In short, the difference between the

that the ﬁrst objection

is

was not speciﬁc (nor

its

basis clear

obj ections

from the context), while the second

district court’s ultimate ruling

Moreover, the

objection was.

two evidentiary rulings on defense counsel’s

was based 0n

relevance, not the

inadmissibility of remedial measures. Rather than the court’s second ruling serving as proof that

its

ﬁrst ruling

was

incorrect, the court’s

t0 the ﬁrst question

8

Earlier in the

(i.e.,

trial,

.

.

foundation

.

I

is

relevance),

it

comments

the district court took issue with defense counsel’s obj ections, explaining:

don’t want t0 be overly picky here, but an objection for lack 0f

not an obj ection. There’s a foundation for relevance, a foundation for

the defense’s objection

9

p.233, L.25

made

too might have been sustained. Therefore, because Estrada

authenticity, a foundation for personal

(T12,

reveal that, had a proper objection been

— p.244,

is

as

opposed

knowledge. So Ineed t0

know more ofwhat

t0 foundation.

L.6.)

Rule 407 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Evidence reads in relevant

part:

When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely
t0 occur, evidence

of the subsequent measures

-

negligence;

°

culpable conduct;

°

a defect in a product or

its

design;

.

.

.

.
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is

not admissible t0 prove:

did not

make

a proper objection to the district court’s ﬁrst ruling, a challenge to that ruling cannot

be reviewed and he has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the

district court’s ruling.

Any Error Was Harmless

D.

Even When

deemed harmless

the

trial

court has abused

not affected.” State

if a substantial right is

247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); I.C.R. 52 (“Any error,
substantial rights

discretion, such “abuse

its

must be disregarded”). In

V.

of discretion

may

be

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363,

defect, irregularity or variance that does not affect

this case,

even

if the district court erred in overruling

defense counsel’s objection t0 the question of whether any changes were

made

in Safe Passage’s

housing assistance application procedures after Estrada was ﬁred, any such error was harmless.

That Safe Passage revamped
Estrada’s crimes in June 2018

testiﬁed that, in

March 2018,

was not

there

Ls.2-7.) Unlike a tort cases based

at issue, the existence

Estrada’s jury

trial.

prejudicial because

its

housing assistance request program
injurious to her substantial rights.

were “holes”

Chauntelle Lieske

in the procedures at Safe Passage.

0n negligence 0f a party,

in

Which defects

(T11,

after Estrada

p.331,

(0r holes) are directly

of holes in Safe Passage’s procedures was neither disputed nor

Whether those holes were corrected
it

after discovering

at issue in

was ﬁred was not

unfairly

did not suggest Estrada should be convicted 0n an improper basis.

Next, Estrada’s defense counsel “opened the door” for the prosecutor to ask whether any
remedial measures had been taken.

In questioning Patricia

Wheeler about checks over $300

earmarked t0 those seeking housing assistance, defense counsel asked, “[a]nd When you say

was

it

an amount that was above $300 that would require more than one signature?” (Tn, p.254,

Ls.8-10.)

Ms. Wheeler

replied,

counsel then asked, “Okay.

have

that,

t0 clarify that

Has

“At

that time that

that changed.

with Chauntelle.”

”

was

the policy.”

and Ms. Wheeler

(Tn, p.254, L.11.)

replied, “I don’t

(Tn, p.254, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).)
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Defense

know. You’d
In her cross-

examination of Chauntelle Lieske, defense counsel asked, “Did anybody from

you

to update

VOCA encourage

your practices in 2018?” (Tn, p.324, Ls.23-24.) Ms. Lieske answered, “No.”

(T11,

p.324, L25.) In sum, defense counsel asked Ms. Wheeler Whether a remedial measure had been

taken for the required number of check signatures, and asked Ms. Lieske if
Safe Passage t0 update

its

Defense counsel’s choice

practices in 2018.

VOCA had encouraged

t0

subject area and present evidence 0f changes to Safe Passages procedures

court’s ruling

on the prosecution’s

Finally,

herein,

and the

efforts to explore the

based 0n the testimony presented
state’s

open the door

shows any

t0 that

error in the

same subject were ultimately harmless.

at trial as set forth in the

harmless error argument presented in regard t0 Issue

I

Statement 0f Facts

herein,

any error was

necessarily harmless.

CONCLUSION
The
grand

state respectﬁllly requests that this

Court afﬁrm Estrada’s convictions for forgery and

theft.

DATED this 24th day 0f June, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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